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A.  Historical Background and Establishment
1  The Warsaw Treaty Organization was created by the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (‘Warsaw Pact’) on 14 May 1955 in the Polish Capital, 
supplemented by a Resolution on the Establishment of a Joint Command of the Armed 
Forces of the Signatories to the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. 
The Warsaw Pact was initiated by the USSR and signed by the USSR and its allies Albania, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (‘GDR’), Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania. The Warsaw Pact, a multilateral treaty of alliance consisting of 11 articles was 
concluded in addition to the existing bilateral treaties of the USSR, with all but two 
signatories of the Warsaw Pact. The GDR and Albania had not been parties to the system of 
bilateral treaties, and hence the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact represented a significant 
extension of the Soviet system of → alliances at the time of its creation.
2  The Warsaw Pact was concluded according to its Art. 11 for a limited time of 20 years, 
with the possibility of an extension for further 10 years. Such an extension occurred in 
1975. After the expiry of this period, on 26 April 1985, a Protocol Extending the Period of 
Validity of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (‘1985 Protocol’) 
was concluded stipulating that the Warsaw Pact remains in force for further 20 years. This 
protocol also opened the possibility of an automatic extension of another 10 years.
B.  Main Purposes
3  The immediate reason of the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact expressly reflected in its 
preamble was the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the → North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) on 6 May 1955. At the same time, the formation of a legally 
defined, multilateral alliance reinforced the USSR’s claim to be leader of the world socialist 
system. Against this background and in the circumstances of the → Cold War (1947–91), 
references to the desire to create a system of → collective security in Europe based on the 
participation of all European States in the preamble and in Art. 11 Warsaw Pact did not 
reflect the realities of the time. Instead, the Warsaw Pact was rather focused on collective 
→ self-defence, and served as a useful tool for the USSR to control its Eastern European 
allies. Further, the Warsaw Pact created a sound legal basis for the military presence of the 
USSR in Hungary and Romania, and provided the USSR an official counterweight to NATO 
in East–West diplomacy.
4  Both the preamble and Art. 4 Warsaw Pact made it clear that the central purpose of the 
establishment of the organization was to ensure the exercise of the right of self-defence, 
both collective and individual in accordance with Art. 51 → United Nations Charter (145 
BSP 805). Art. 4 Warsaw Pact provides:
In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or more of the States Parties to 
the Treaty by any State or group of States, each State Party to the Treaty shall, in 
the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, afford the State or States so attacked 
immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with the other States Parties to 
the Treaty, by all the means it considers necessary, including the use of armed force.
5  This language does not create an automatic obligation on the members to actually use 
force in defence of the member attacked (see also → Use of Force, Prohibition of). Rather, it 
leaves room for each ally in their decision whether or not to protect the → territorial 
integrity and political independence of each other and on the manner and means of doing 
so. The only clear cut obligation arising from Art. 4 Warsaw Pact in case of an armed attack 
was that the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact had to consult together immediately 
concerning the joint measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
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security. Art. 4 Warsaw Pact is carefully worded to follow the provisions of Art. 51 United 
Nations Charter. The scope of Art. 4 Warsaw Pact is, however, expressly limited to → armed 
attack[s] in Europe, even though the larger part of the territory of the USSR lay outside 
Europe. Art. 4 Warsaw Pact was never invoked throughout its 36-year history.
6  More practical relevance could be attached to the → consultation mechanism envisaged 
by Art. 3 Warsaw Pact, according to which the contracting parties would consult together 
on all important international questions involving their common interest, with a view to 
strengthening international peace and security. Further, if any one of the contracting 
parties considered that a threat of armed attack on one or more of the State Parties had 
arisen, Art. 3 Warsaw Pact foresaw an immediate consultation with a view to providing for 
their joint defence and maintaining peace and security.
7  In spite of its primary focus on self-defence, the preamble of the Warsaw Pact referred to 
the desire to create a system of collective security based on the participation of all 
European States and the need to ensure peace in Europe. Although that language remained 
to be mere lip service throughout the existence of the organization, the members of the 
Warsaw Pact repeatedly took part in efforts aimed at reducing conventional armed forces in 
Europe. In 1973, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks started in Vienna between 
the United States, the USSR, and other NATO and Warsaw Pact members with a view to 
reduce troops and armaments in Central Europe. The talks never reached an agreement, 
and were ultimately replaced in 1989 by → negotiation[s] within the framework of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (→ Organization for Security and Co- 
operation in Europe [OSCE]) between NATO and the Warsaw Pact members. In the changed 
circumstances, these negotiations were successful and lead to the signing of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on 19 November 1990 in Paris ((1991) 30 ILM 6). The 




8  As the original eight members of the Warsaw Pact were European, the organization can 
be regarded as a means of → regional co-operation. Membership in the Warsaw Pact was 
nevertheless not formally limited to European States. The preamble of the Warsaw Pact 
referred to the need that the peace-loving States of Europe take the necessary steps to 
safeguard their security and to promote the maintenance of peace in Europe. But Art. 9 
Warsaw Pact allowed for the possibility of accession without geographical limitation.
9  During the existence of the Warsaw Pact, membership remained relatively constant. Both 
the Warsaw Pact and the 1985 Protocol expressly provided for the possibility of unilateral 
termination on a notice of one year. Albania withdrew from the organization in 1968 in 
response to the armed intervention of the USSR and its allies in Czechoslovakia. Besides 
this no member made effective use of this opportunity until the collapse of communist rule 
in Eastern Europe. The GDR left the organization in the process of the reunification of 
Germany in September 1990 only a few months before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 
February 1991. This was clearly a result of the fact that the Warsaw Pact operated as a 
means of maintaining the → hegemony of the USSR in Eastern Europe. An example of this 
was the fact that the intention of the Hungarian Government to withdraw from the Warsaw 
Pact in the course of the 1956 revolution declared in a telegram to diplomatic missions in 
Budapest on 1 November 1956 (reprinted in Mastny and Byrne 83) was responded to by a 
military intervention of the Soviet army. For similar reasons, no new member joined the 
Warsaw Pact in the course of its existence. Although Mongolia applied for membership on 
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15 July 1963 (reprinted in Mastny and Byrne 152), the application was not supported by the 
allies of the USSR nor by the Soviet government in the end either.
2.  Organs
10  The Warsaw Pact provided for the establishment of two organs: in Art. 5 Warsaw Pact a 
Unified Command; and in Art. 6 Warsaw Pact a Political Consultative Committee (‘PCC’). 
Art. 6 Warsaw Pact also authorized the PCC to establish auxiliary organs as may prove to be 
necessary. The creation of these auxiliary organs by the PCC occurred via unpublished 
resolutions as did also the regulation of their powers and their relationship vis-à-vis other 
organs of the organization. Accordingly, parts of the institutional framework of the Warsaw 
Pact can be reconstructed from press communiqués following the meeting of the PCC.
11  The Joint Command was established by the Resolution on the Establishment of a Joint 
Command of the Armed Forces of the Signatories to the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation 
and Mutual Assistance on the day the Warsaw Pact was signed. The formation of the PCC 
was only announced on 20 January 1956 ([1956] 12 (1) Zbiór Dokumentów 91). On its first 
meeting, the PCC created as auxiliary organs a Permanent Commission for Foreign Policy 
Issues and a Joint Secretariat. Neither of these organs became visibly operational in the 
early years of the organization. On 17 March 1969, in a meeting of the PCC in Budapest, 
some structural reforms were decided (‘Budapest Reforms’), involving the creation of the 
Committee of Defence Ministers, the Military Council, and the Technical Committee of the 
Joint Armed Forces (New Secret Statutes of the Warsaw Pact). In January 1972 the PCC 
announced that its activities were aided by a Secretary General to the PCC. A second round 
of institutional changes adopted on 26 November 1976 in Bucharest created as a political 
organ a Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and recreated the Joint Secretariat 
([1976] 32 Zbiór Dokumentów 1182).
12  Within the institutional framework of the Warsaw Pact the PCC possessed a central role 
as the highest political body. Art. 6 Warsaw Pact stated that each State-participant of the 
Warsaw Pact would be represented in the PCC by a member of the government or another 
specially appointed representative. The first session of the PCC was attended by chairmen 
or first vice-chairmen of the councils of ministers, and the ministers of defence. Later it 
became practice that the delegations of the Member States were led by the first or general 
secretary of the communist party of the respective country. After 1961, the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Joint Armed Forces regularly took part in the meetings of the PCC, and from 
1972 so did the Secretary General.
13  The powers of the PCC are only vaguely defined by Art. 6 Warsaw Pact as ‘carrying out 
the consultations provided for in the present Treaty between the States Parties’ and 
‘consideration of matters arising in connexion with application of the present Treaty’. It 
remained unclear to what an extent the PCC independently issued general policy directions.
14  The meetings of the foreign ministers had an important role in the operation of the 
alliance from 1959, and the creation of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
reinforced this role. Coordination of the foreign policy of the members effectively took place 
in the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, taking into account the PCC foreign policy 
resolutions and recommendations. Further, the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
had the task of preparing the agendas and resolutions of the PCC and supervising the 
implementation of the foreign policy decisions by the individual Member States. Given the 
nature of the relationship between the USSR and its allies, such supervision was clearly 
unimaginable vis-à-vis the USSR.
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15  The Committee of Ministers of Defence—consisting of the defence ministers of the 
Member States and of the Chief of Staff of the Joined Armed Forces—was the highest 
military body of the Warsaw Pact, governed by the New Secret Statutes of the Warsaw Pact 
of 17 March 1969. This committee had the task of discussing questions on strengthening 
the defence capacity of the allies and of elaborating recommendations of the PCC.
16  Actual military leadership was to be exercised in the Warsaw Pact by the Joint 
Command of the Joint Armed forces, headed by a Commander-in-Chief and having its 
headquarters in Moscow. Neither the Warsaw Pact nor the Resolution on the Establishment 
of a Joint Command regulated the manner in which the Commander-in-Chief was to be 
appointed. Throughout the history of the Warsaw Pact it has not become clear who had the 
capacity to appoint the Commander-in-Chief. The times of the appointment of the different 
Commanders-in-Chief—all Soviet nationals—did not correlate with the meetings of the PCC. 
It was even unclear, whether this position was a full-time occupation. Only after the collapse 
of the USSR has a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR 
become public, and according to this the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed forces 
should have been identical to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR. 
The Commander-in-Chief was assisted by deputies, these were initially defence ministers of 
the allies, and after the Budapest Reforms in 1969 the deputies were the defence ministers’ 
deputies.
3.  Decision-Making Process
17  The Warsaw Pact itself did not contain a general provision on the way decisions were to 
be made within the organization. Certain questions are referred to consultation of the 
parties (ie when a threat of armed attack arises under Art. 3 Warsaw Pact, or an actual 
armed attack occurs under Art. 4 Warsaw Pact), and Art. 5 Warsaw Pact refers to further 
agreement on the Joint Command. The latter certainly presupposes unanimity, but the 
absence of the regulation of the decision-making process and the formally equal sovereignty 
of the members (→ States, Sovereign Equality) imply that all decisions were to be made by 
→ consensus. Beyond this legal presumption, however, historical analysis indicates that 
major decisions were made by the headquarters of the armed forces of the USSR.
4.  Finances
18  No actual records are available on the finances of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. 
Scholarly treatises are also silent on this matter. This is certainly a result of the secrecy 
surrounding the organization, but it can also be explained by the relatively low intensity of 
the formalized activities of the alliance. Based on the fact that all important organs of the 
Warsaw Pact were located in Moscow it is assumed by some commentators that the 
operational costs of the pact were born by the USSR.
D.  Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
19  The collapse of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe made the dissolution of the Pact 
inevitable. As a first step, a Protocol was signed on 25 February 1991 in Budapest by the 
remaining six members that dissolved all military organs and structures of the organization 
as of 31 March 1991. Shortly thereafter, on 1 July 1991 in Prague a new Protocol was 
signed that declared that upon the entry into force of the Protocol the Warsaw Pact would 
cease to exist and that the signatories to the Protocol would have no pecuniary claims 
against each other based on the Warsaw Pact.
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E.  Special Legal Problems
20  Special legal problems could have arisen from the relationship between the Warsaw 
Pact and the bilateral treaties of alliance between the members of the Warsaw Pact. The 
bilateral treaties existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty were later replaced, and 
the new treaties also became subject to amendments. These treaties also provided for a 
mutual obligation of assistance in the case of an armed attack, yet the scope of the 
respective provisions was not limited to Europe. Further, the language of these provisions 
was often slightly different from each other and from the Warsaw Pact itself.
21  A differing language could also have posed a—at least—theoretical problem with regard 
to the GDR. The German language version of Art. 4 Warsaw Pact provided for the obligation 
to afford assistance to the Member State attacked ‘individually and in agreement with the 
other States Parties to the Treaty, by all the means they consider necessary’ (translation by 
the author; emphasis added). In contrast, other language versions of the Warsaw Pact 
required assistance from the members ‘by all the means it considers necessary’ (emphasis 
added). From this it could be inferred that the GDR could not decide about the means 
necessary to provide assistance on its own. In practice, this interpretational question 
remained unsettled; in any case, in light of the decisive role of the Joint Command of the 
Armed Forces practically exercised by the headquarters of the Soviet army, it can be 
qualified as an academic one.
F.  Evaluation
22  Records of the meetings of the different organs of the Warsaw Pact indicate that the 
formalized activity of the organization was never really intensive. Between 1955 and 1991 
the PCC did not convene more than 25 times. In general, the whole functioning of the 
organization was not characterized by formal procedures and decision-making. This was a 
logical consequence of the predominant role of the USSR within the Warsaw Pact and the 
general lack of the → rule of law in the States of the Soviet influence zone.
23  It would be an overstatement to describe the Warsaw Treaty Organization as the legal 
means of maintaining Soviet hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact 
itself did not refer to the necessity of protecting the socialist political and economic system 
in the Member States, as opposed to many bilateral treaties concluded or amended from 
1970 onwards between different members of the Warsaw Pact. Nor did it authorize any sort 
of intervention in case a member decided to leave the alliance. Accordingly, the military 
intervention in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia did not formally occur under the auspices of 
the Warsaw Pact. Yet the Warsaw Pact existed because of the political and military division 
of Europe and was certainly the symbolic expression of the Soviet rule that lasted more 
than 40 years in the region.
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